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Summary
Discussions of the economic costs and benefits of EMU usually take as their basis the optimum
currency area (OCA) approach. This approach starts from the premise that when an external shock hits
the economy, it is easier to adjust the exchange rate than domestic prices or wages. Most economists
accept the general idea behind this approach, namely that nominal wages are usually sticky in the short-
run and that it is therefore easier to adjust to external shocks and obtain changes in the real exchange
rate or the terms of trade through a movement in the exchange rate. But there is little agreement on
how important these "external" shocks are in reality.
We try to measure the importance of external shocks for (un)employment. We find that external
shocks have little impact on unemployment, but are more important in the evolution of employment in
manufacturing. The results differ, however, strongly from country to country and for about half of EU
member countries we did not find any significant relationship. Taking into account various potential
shock absorbers (exchange rate movements, fiscal and monetary policy) does not affect the results. We
conclude that the loss of the exchange rate instrument will not lead to massive unemployment prob-
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I. Introduction
Discussions of the economic costs and benefits of EMU usually take as their basis the optimum
currency area (OCA) approach. This approach starts from the premise that when an external
shock hits the economy, it is easier to adjust the exchange rate than domestic prices or wages. In
the words of Mundell (1961):
"A system of flexible exchange rates is usually presented, by its proponents, as a device
whereby depreciation can take the place of unemployment when the external balance is in deficit,
and appreciation can replace inflation when it is in surplus (p. 657)."
Most economists accept the general idea behind this approach, namely that nominal wages are
usually sticky in the short-run and that it is therefore easier to adjust to external shocks and obtain
changes in the real exchange rate or the terms of trade through a movement in the exchange rate.
But there is little agreement on how important these "external" shocks are in reality. Will the loss
of the exchange rate instrument lead to massive unemployment because large negative external
shocks are likely? Or do external shocks play only a marginal role in the evolution of unemploy-
ment? The presumption of most economists would be that external shocks should have a signifi-
cant impact at least for small countries.
Thus, one key question to ask in evaluating the economic case against EMU is: Do external
shocks (i.e. shocks to exports and/or the exchange rate) have a strong impact on (un)employment
in member countries? This is an empirical issue that has not been addressed in the literature up to
now.
The OCA approach usually asks the question: what does a country lose by giving up the exchange
rate as an adjustment instrument? Implicit in this approach is the view that the alternative to par-
ticipating in a monetary union is a world in which exchange rates move only in response to shocks
and offset them automatically. But this might not be the alternative that is available in reality.
Politicians have always asserted that exchange rates often do not move along with fundamentals
and that their variability is costly. Recent research has shown that the variability that one observes
in foreign exchange markets cannot be explained consistently by the behaviour of fundamentals
(Baxter and Stockman 1993; Flood and Rose 1995; Rose 1995). If one accepts the finding that
actual exchange rate variability is -at least to a certain extent- excessive one should ask whether it
is just a nuisance or whether it has an impact on the real sector (Belke and Gros 1997). We will
abstract from this issue here and will just try to identify the impact of external shocks on two key
labour market indicators namely (economy-wide) unemployment and employment in manufactur-
ing assuming implicitly that the alternative to fixing the exchange rate is an ideal world in which
exchange rates act as shock absorbers.
As in all empirical work we had to take a number of practical decisions concerning sample peri-
ods, methods, etc. We stuck with annual data throughout the paper because we are convinced- 4 -
that fundamental shocks to export demand do not occur with a quarterly frequency. We restricted
our sample to the 12 EC countries (as of 1994) for which consistent data available from one
source.
The paper is organised as follows: part II gives a brief overview of the empirical literature on the
optimum currency area approach. Part III starts with investigating the impact of external shocks
on employment and unemployment in EU member states on the basis of some simple time series
'causality tests'. Part IV extends this approach laying particular emphasis on the robustness of
these results. It is tested whether the absence of a clear relationship between (un-) employment
and export shocks is due to a consistent policy that on average offsets the impact of export
shocks by using optimally some policy instrument, for example, the exchange rate, fiscal or
monetary policy. Part V discusses some implications of the results and compares them with the
result one obtains by applying the same method to investment shocks. Part VI concludes.
II. The Optimum Currency Area Approach
as Presented in the Existing Empirical Literature
The standard argument in support of exchange rate flexibility is as follows: if a shock reduces the
demand for the exports of a country, a real depreciation is required in order to maintain full em-
ployment and external equilibrium. The required real depreciation could also be achieved by a re-
duction in nominal ("money") wages, but this takes time and can presumably be achieved only if
there is a period of substantial unemployment. A real-wage reduction will actually be the more
difficult to achieve the more downward money wage rigidities prevail and the lower inflation al-
ready is. The proper exchange rate policy could thus reduce, and possibly even eliminate, the un-
employment problems that arise from "asymmetric shocks". This line of reasoning has become the
standard argument against EMU. Asymmetric shocks, it is often argued, will invariably ratchet up
unemployment (Bean 1994; Gordon 1996).
There are not many available studies on the potential importance of this effect, however, which
attempt to test this line of reasoning directly (Belke 1996). They usually analyse the degree to
which various macroeconomic indicators, e.g. output, the real exchange rate, unemployment, etc.,
are correlated across countries. A finding that these correlations are low is then usually inter-
preted as implying that the countries concerned are subject to important asymmetric shocks and
that they would incur large economic costs if they formed a monetary union.
It is difficult to decide a priori what degree of correlation is acceptable, since there is no theoreti-
cal reason to accept a correlation coefficient of say 90% for GDP growth or unemployment as
sufficiently high for EMU, but reject anything below that figure. The implicit or explicit bench-
mark most often is the US in the sense that it is argued that if the economies of member countries
of the EU show a similar degree of correlation as do states or regions inside the US, EMU should
not create any particular problems for Europe.
Many previous studies have followed this approach. It is sufficient here to take just one prominent
example that is representative of most of this literature. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) com-
pare the correlation of certain shocks to output among 8 regions within the US and among 11- 5 -
member states within the EU.1 They distinguish between shocks that have transitory effects,
which they assume to be demand shocks, and those that have permanent effects, which they as-
sume to be supply shocks. Their main finding is that the supply shocks, thus defined, are larger in
magnitude and less correlated across regions in Europe than in the US, whereas the opposite
holds for demand (i.e. transitory) shocks. Moreover, they also confirm that the core of the EU
(here D, F, BE, NL and DK) constitutes a more homogeneous sub-unit. Within this restricted
group of countries, supply (i.e. permanent) shocks are of roughly the same magnitude and cohe-
sion as in the US. Their conclusion is that a core EMU is economically advisable, but not a wider
EMU.
The study by Bayoumi and Eichengreen also illustrates a key problem in the empirical literature
on the optimum currency area approach: the correlations in macroeconomic variables found for
the past reflect not only the working of true shocks (i.e. "intrinsic" factors like taste and technol-
ogy), but also, and perhaps mainly, the extent to which monetary and fiscal policy have in the
past tended to move together across countries (under different exchange rate regimes).2 The
authors try to take this into account by distinguishing between supply shocks (presumably inde-
pendent of policy) and demand shocks that might come from monetary and/or fiscal policy. Nei-
ther they nor any other researchers in this field, however, take into account that the OCA is based
on the need to adjust the real exchange rate in response to external shocks. In none of the existing
empirical analyses of EMU is a distinction made between external and domestic shocks. This is a
crucial oversight, as argued below.
Another way to search for asymmetric shocks looks at differences in economic structures, e.g.
differences in the share of output accounted for by different industries or the product composition
of exports. The underlying hypothesis here is that countries that have different economic struc-
tures are likely to experience asymmetric shocks. Gros (1996a) provides a number of indicators
along this line and shows that they can give quite different results. This approach can in principle
provide some information on likely sources of shocks, but it cannot provide evidence on the size
of the asymmetric shocks one should expect in reality. For example, a finding that two countries
export different arrays of goods (as opposed to two different goods) has little implication for the
likelihood of asymmetric shocks to aggregate exports: if the shocks to supply and/or demand that
affect individual exporting industries or products are uncorrelated, the magnitude of the correla-
tion coefficient between the sums of each country is not affected by the distribution of the shares
in their sums.
                                           
1 A somewhat different approach can be found in De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993) who analyse the vari-
ability of real exchange rates across regions and countries. Their finding that real exchange rates vary more
significantly across countries than across regions within a country is difficult to interpret. Is it due to an excess
volatility of exchange rates or are there large asymmetric shocks (policy or other) that provoke this exchange
rate variability?
2 One could thus argue that the high correlations found for the core countries are probably an underestimate of
the correlations that would result under EMU (i.e. with a unified monetary policy). It also cannot be excluded
that some of the countries that had lower correlations in the past would actually belong to the core once they
also belonged to EMU.- 6 -
The available literature thus looks only at the potential for asymmetric shocks or measures co-
movements in macroeconomic variables without showing how external shocks lead to
unemployment. The basic question that has not yet been addressed in the literature is: are the
"classic" asymmetric shocks, i.e. shocks to export demand, actually an important determinant of
unemployment? A subsidiary question would concern the role of exchange rate adjustments in
containing unemployment generated by shocks to export. These are key questions for any
evaluation of EMU, because if the answer to both questions is yes (i.e. external shocks and the
exchange rate are important for unemployment) one would have to conclude that the costs of
EMU are high.
Before starting with the econometric investigation it will be useful to calculate an order of
magnitude of the effects that one could expect. Exports of goods and services amount to about 30
% of GDP, on average, for the EU15.3 This is somewhat larger than the share of investment in
GDP, which on average for the EU15 was equal to about 20 % during the 1980s. Shocks to
investment are usually taken to be a major determinant of the business cycle and employment. The
slightly lower share of investment in GDP implies that one could expect that shocks to exports are
at least equally important, however, we found the opposite: the relationship of investment with
unemployment is much stronger.
The OCA approach (and this paper) focuses on the impact of external shocks on unemployment
as opposed to output. The latter two variables are closely linked, however. For most countries,
the standard Okun curve-type relationship translates a fall in GDP of 1% into an increase in
unemployment of about 0.3 %. Given a ratio of exports to GDP of about 30 % an accounting
approach would thus suggest that the partial effect of a change in exports on unemployment
should be around 0.3 times the Okun coefficient. This implies that the effect of an increase in
exports of 1 % should lead to an increase in the unemployment rate of around 0.09 percentage
points.
The combination of the Okun coefficient and the fact that exports account for about one third of
overall demand implies that shocks to exports would have to be large to have a sizeable impact on
aggregate unemployment. But this cannot be excluded. For the larger EU member countries the
standard deviation of the growth rate of (the volume of) exports is about 5 % p.a. It follows that a
two standard deviation shock to exports should increase unemployment by about one full
percentage point. This can be compared to the standard deviation of changes4 in (national)
unemployment rates which range from about 0.5 - 0.7 percentage points (p.a.) for countries like
France, Germany and Italy to 1.4 percentage points for Spain if measured over the last 30 years.
External shocks could thus have potentially a large impact relative to the historical variability of
                                           
3 About two thirds of all international trade of EU member countries is intra-EU. Given an overall ratio of trade
to GDP of 30 %, this implies that intra-EU exports should amount to about 20 % of GDP for a typical member
country (a bit less for the larger ones and more for the smaller ones). Data on the distribution (intra- versus
extra-EU) of trade in services is, however, not published. This is the reason for the fact that the degree of eco-
nomic interdependence is usually illustrated with data on the ratio of intra-EU trade in goods to EU GDP. This
ratio is only about 15 %.
4 As unemployment rates are widely considered to non-stationary, see below.- 7 -
unemployment. For those who believe in Keynesian multipliers the impact could be even larger
than estimated so far.5
These simple calculations suggest an order of magnitude for the potential impact of export
shocks on unemployment. In discussing the likely costs of EMU one must, however, also define
the alternative. In an ideal world member countries could use the exchange rate to mitigate the
impact of external shocks on the domestic labour market. (This does not imply that the current
account and exports would have to be constant, they would just not deviate from the level that
would be compatible with full equilibrium.) The key problem is that it is impossible to determine a
priori what fraction of the macroeconomic cost caused by an external shock could be avoided
through an exchange rate adjustment. If employment is the only policy target and there are no
other shocks, a flexible exchange rate could eliminate 100% of the potential cost of (external)
shocks. In a more general environment with more shocks, imperfect information about them an
multiple policy targets as well as instruments flexible exchange rates will no longer be able to
guarantee continous equilibrium on the labour market. Without specifying more of the underlying
model it is not possible to say how large the cost of fixing exchange rates would be. The model
simulations mentioned below suggest that about one half of the effect of an external shock could
be avoided through flexible exchange rates. This would appear reasonable in an environment with
two sources of shocks displaying a similar variance (exports and investment) and two policy
instruments (fiscal and monetary policy).
A second point that one has to keep in mind when discussing the potential costs of EMU is that
the exchange rate vis-à-vis the rest of the world will remain flexible. The ECB could take care of
common shocks and member countries should be concerned only about idiosyncratic shocks. We
define, as usual, idiosyncratic shocks as the difference between the national value and the
corresponding EU average. On this basis the variability of export shocks is smaller. The standard
deviation of the difference between national and EU average growth rates of real exports is for
most member countries about 3 % (per annum). The variability of idiosyncratic shocks to exports
is thus about one third smaller than the variability of total exports.6
The approach followed in this paper eschews structure. Another strategy would be to impose as much
structure as possible by using a large model of the economy that allows one to calculate exactly the im-
pact of a shock to export demand on output and other variables. One example of this approach can be
found in Emerson et al. (1990) who use a large econometric model of the EC (called Quest) which in-
corporates the short-term wage rigidity that is at the base of the OCA. Simulations with this model
suggest that a 5% shock to French export demand leads to a substantial fall in output (and prices) in
France. If exchange rates are fixed, French output falls by about 1.3% in the first year and returns to
baseline only by year seven. Under flexible exchange rates, however, the initial fall in output amounts
still to 0.6% and the subsequent recovery is actually slower, so that the difference in present values of
the GDP loss between fixed and flexible exchange rates is only 1.3%. Recent simulations with the
                                           
5 For the detailed descriptive statistics see annex 2.
6 The standard deviation of the difference between the national and the EU average (of the first difference of)
unemployment rates is also about one third lower than the national ones. For France and Germany this meas-
ure of idiosyncratic shocks to unemployment is 0.29 and 0.45 % respectively. See annex 2.- 8 -
MultiMod model of the IMF confirm this result in the sense that the fall in output resulting from an ex-
ogenous fall in exports of 5% is only one-half of one percentage point of GDP higher under fixed ex-
change rates (private communication).
III. A Direct Test of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) Approach
How can one measure to what extent external shocks affect (un-) employment? In principle, there
are two ways: i) one could use a large macroeconomic model which traces the impact of such
shocks (e.g. changes in export demand) through the entire economy under various assumptions
about the flexibility of wages and the exchange rate, or ii) one could try to measure "only" the
extent to which (changes in) exports have "caused" (changes in) (un-) employment in the past.
Some results using the first method are reported later in section 3. This section mainly uses the
second method based on standard "causality tests". The underlying hypothesis in this case is that
export supply is rather stable so that one can equate actual changes (innovations) in exports with
changes in export demand. All the results presented here are implicitly based on a comparison of
two regression equations:
a) duet = a + Si=1 ai duet-i + error term, and
b) duet = a + Si=1 ai duet-i + Si=0 ßi dexpt-i + error term,
where S stands for a summation that starts with the element indicated in the subscript, duet stands
for (the change in) unemployment (between period t and t-1) and dexpt-i stands for the change in
exports between period t-i and period t-i-1. Exports (measured by various indicators as explained
below) can then be said to "cause" unemployment if the ßs, i.e. the coefficients on past and con-
temporaneous exports, are together significantly different from zero. In other words, these tests
measure the impact of (changes in various measures of) export performance on (changes in) na-
tional unemployment rates once the autonomous movements in unemployment have been taken
into account by including lagged unemployment rates among the explanatory variables. Thus, a
significant effect (of whatever sign) implies that one can reject the hypothesis that exports do not
influence unemployment at the usual confidence levels. In order to be allowed to use the standard
t- and F-distributions for the purpose of model selection one has to use changes as the levels of
both variables are clearly non-stationary (see Annex 3). Substituting ‘de’ for ‘due’ in the above
setting describes our proceedings in the case of employment instead of unemployment.
a. Unemployment
Tables 1a and 1b summarise the results of causality tests with respect to unemployment using an-
nual data (for more details see Gros and Jones 1995). The tables basically report the results from
a fishing trip. The results that are not interesting in the usual sense that they yielded a good catch
of "significant" relationships. On the contrary, their interest lies in revealing an absence of a
strong and robust link between unemployment and (past changes in) exports. However, this does
not mean that our search has been done in an unsystematic manner. The specifications of the un-
derlying equations throughout this paper have been based on the usual diagnostic tests, e.g. the- 9 -
LM autocorrelation test. These tests have been combined with the Schwarz Bayesian Information
Criterion (SCH). I.e. the regression which reveals the lowest SCH-value (given the same number
of observations for the alternative specifications) and at the same time fulfills the usual diagnostic
residual criteria is chosen. The SCH criterion has been preferred to the Akaike Criterion since it
can be shown that the former in contrast to the latter asymptotically determines the true model
(consistency) under certain assumptions (Banerjee et al. 1993: 286; Mills 1990: 139; Schwarz
1978). We always followed the same procedure throughout this paper, no judgemental factors
were allowed to intervene.
Each entry in the following tables shows up in the table if the variable listed at the head of the
column turned out to have a significant influence on unemployment for the particular country
concerned. The four columns report the results of tests of the hypothesis that (changes in) na-
tional unemployment rates are not affected by shocks to the following variables:
i) changes (growth rates) in exports in constant 1990 ecus,
ii) changes in intra-European exports as a percentage of GDP,
iii) changes in total exports as a percentage of GDP,
iv) the contribution of exports to the growth in final uses,
v) unexpected changes in exports in constant 1990 ecus, and
vi) unexpected changes in intra-European exports as a percentage of GDP.
The unexpected shocks v) and vi) are used to identify shocks, as opposed to actual changes. By
this, we are able to put our arguments on a somewhat broader basis. One could argue that the
shocks to export demand i) to iv) are misspecified since they include export changes which in
principle could be easily anticipated and neutralised by rational agents on the basis of export de-
mand functions. Thus, we redefine the export shocks i) and ii) by subtracting that part which is
determined by the change in foreign EU demand in each case. For this purpose we used a two-step
procedure. In a first step, we estimate export demand equations (D(EXPECU) and D(EXPGDP))
for each country by regressing the change in the respective export indicator on its own lags, on
the change in EU GDP and, if indicated, on structural break dummies. The equations estimated
for D(EXPECU) are reported in Annex 1.7 In a second step, we eliminate the estimated dummy
impact from the residuals of the first-step regression and call the remaining series RESEXPECUF
resp. RESEXPGDPF. The implicit assumption here is that the shocks proxied by the dummies
cannot be anticipated. However, since the coefficients of the first-step regression and thus also the
residuals are still influenced by the first-step dummies, our procedure seems to be a fair compro-
mise.
Annex 2 gives the average and standard deviation of the variables used here. Exports are variable
and difficult to predict. For example, over the period 1960–96 for Germany the standard deviation
of the first (and operationally best performing) variable, the change in real ecu exports
D(EXPECU) was 4.18 percentage points, (with an average of 5.78 percent). The reason for this
                                           
7 The estimated equations for D(EXPGDP) are available from the authors on request.- 10 -
is that trade consists to about 60 to 70 % of intermediate or investment goods whose demand is
notoriously unstable (Baxter 1995).
In order to minimise clutter, the table has no entry in a cell if one cannot reject the null hypothesis
of no relationship at the usual confidence levels. A negative sign implies that one can reject this
null hypothesis and that, in particular, an increase in one of these proxies for export performance
leads to a fall in unemployment (as one would expect). A positive sign implies the opposite and
would be difficult to explain. Both coefficient estimates, including their significance levels, and the
lag order of export shocks are tabulated explicitly. Tables 1a and 1b display the results.
Table 1a - Summary results for unemployment changes
as a function of export performance (OLS)
Ind.var.
country
D(EXPECU) D(EXPGDPEU) D(EXPGDP) D(EXPCONTR) RESEXPECUF RESEXPGDPF







(-2) 0.160* (-1) -0.273*** (-2) 0.292*
GR
IR (-1) -0.125* (-1) -0.096**
IT (0) 0.028* (0)   0.393*** (0)  0.215*** (0)   0.0428***
(-2) -0.044***










(0) -0.055*** (-2) -0.172**
Note: Key to independent variable list: D(EXPECU) = Change in constant ECU exports; D(EXPGDPEU) =
Change in intra-European exports as percentage of GDP; D(EXPGDP) = Change in total exports as percentage of
GDP; EXPCONTR = Export contribution to the growth in final uses; RESEXPECUF, RESEXPGDPEUF = as
defined in the text. Data source: European Commission. The table summarises results from regressions on annual
data (1960-1996); */**/*** indicates significance at a=0.1/0.05/0.01. Additional country-specific dummies were
included when necessary. Lag order of the export variable in brackets.
The five columns in Tab. 1b use two different measures of unemployment performance: i) the
difference between national and EU average unemployment rates (to correct for any EU business
cycle and to concentrate on nationally asymmetric shocks) in the last two columns and ii) the first
three columns use the change in this variable because some unit root tests indicate that the differ-- 11 -
ence between the national value and the EU average is not stationary.8 We used this variable be-
cause for a country that has to weigh the costs of participating in EMU the decisive criterion is
whether its own exports behave differently from the E(M)U average. Working in differences (na-
tional–EU value) raises again the issue of stationarity of the dependent variable. In this case the
evidence against stationarity is much weaker and it is difficult to decide whether one should work
in levels or first differences. We display both, but will emphazise the results in first differences be-
cause they are more comparable to the one with national values in table 1a.
The key to the independent variable list reads as follows: EXPCONTRDIFF = Export
contribution to the growth in final uses, difference with European avg. (E8EXPCONTR);
DEXPGDPDIFF = Change in difference with European avg. of total exports as percentage of
GDP; DEXPECUDIFF = Change in difference with European avg. of constant ECU exports
(EXPECUAV)9; EXPGDPDIFF = Total exports as percentage of GDP, difference with European
avg. (E5EXPGDP). EU average unemployment rate = EU15UE (for more detailed information
see the annex).
                                           
8 The measures for export performance used with these dependent variables was then also somewhat different as
explained in the key to Table 1b.
9 This variable is introduced to take account of different degrees of openness of countries in the sample.- 12 -
Table 1b - Summary results for unemployment differences (with European average)
as a function of export performance (OLS)
Dep.
var.
Changes in unemployment differences Unemployment differences
Ind.
var.
EXPCONTRDIFF DEXPGDPDIFF DEXPECUDIFF EXPCONTRDIFF EXPGDPDIFF
BE (-1) -0.049* (-2) -0.053* (-1) -0.073** (-1) -0.016*
DK (-2) -0.153***




IT (-1)  0.360*** (-1) 0.045* (-1) 0.240** (0)   0.178***
(-2) -0.291***
NL (-2) -0.116***
PO (-2) -0.123*** (-2) -0.114* (-2) -0.024** (-1) -0.090*
(-2) -0.114**
(-1) -0.064*
UK (-2) -0.294* (-2) -0.231** (-2) -0.082** (-2) -0.330**
WD (-1)  0.220*** (0)  -0.175* (-1)  0.206**
(-2) -0.242***
Note: Data source: European Commission. The table summarises results from regressions on annual data (1960-
1996); */**/*** indicates significance at a=0.1/0.05/0.01. Additional country-specific dummies were included
when necessary. Lag order of the export variable in brackets.
Even a cursory glance at the columns of Table 1b shows, however, that, at least in the first three
columns with first differences, there are even fewer significant entries (and a number of wrong
signs) so that changing the dependent variable does not affect the conclusion that the impact of
exports on unemployment is weak.10
In Table 1a all variables have the same number of entries (5). But even if one concentrates on the
variables that perform "best", it still remains true that for almost one-half of all member countries,
shocks to exports have in the past played no significant role in determining unemployment in the
way one would expect from the OCA approach. This was found for a medium sized and relatively
closed country like Spain as well as for a small country like Denmark, for poor countries like
Greece and Portugal and for a rich country like, again, Denmark or the Netherlands.
For the other member countries, shocks to exports had some influence on the evolution of unem-
ployment. A closer look at the individual regressions, however (not reported in the table for lack
                                           
10 In some cases in Tab. 1a and 1b, an increase in exports first reduces (increases) unemployment and then in-
creases (decreases) it, with the net effect nearly equal to zero. However, these cases of a significant wrong sign
should be discounted along with some of the weaker coefficients of the right sign. Given the number of regres-
sions that are behind the tables (11 countries using 9 proxies for export demand), it is surprising that there are
not more cases of spurious correlation.- 13 -
of space), shows that this influence was in all cases minor, in the sense that shocks to exports
could explain only a small part of the fluctuations of unemployment rates over time.
With respect to e.g. the first column in Table 1a, the strongest influence of exports on unemploy-
ment can be found in the case of the U.K. This impact is obviously stronger than with respect to
potential EMU candidate countries. Even in the case of the U.K., however, the influence of ex-
ports turns out to be marginal as will be apparent from the regression results that are presented as
an example below (significance levels in parenthesis).
The first regression on annual data for the U.K. (1960-96) gave the following result:
duet = 0.07 + 0.65*duet-1 - 0.38*duet-2
          (0.55)   (0.00)          (0.01)
Standard error of regression 0.664
The second regression gave the following result:
duet = 0.57 + 0.56*duet-1 - 0.31*duet-2 - 0.10*dexpt
          (0.00)      (0.00)         (0.01)           (0.00)
Standard error of regression 0.527
One way to measure the influence of exports is to look at the part of the variability of unemploy-
ment that can be explained by export shocks. These results show that the standard deviation of
the unemployment rate (after accounting for its own past) is 0.664 percentage points. Introducing
the best performing measure of exports performance (the change in real exports), it drops to
0.527 percentage points, or by about 21%. This means that for the U.K., export shocks had a
non-negligible but still rather small effect on unemployment. The coefficient on the contempora-
neous change in exports implies that a one percentage increase in the growth rate of exports (say
from 9 to 10%) is associated with a drop in the U.K. unemployment rate of 0.1 percentage points
(e.g. from 10 to 9.9%). The standard deviation of DEXPECU for the UK was 3.35 percentage
points (see Annex 2). A positive one standard deviation shock would thus lead to a fall in the un-
employment rate by 0.335 percentage points. However, this is a contemporaneous correlation. It
is thus difficult to say whether it indicates a causal relationship (with the effects being felt within
one year) or whether it is just a spurious correlation due to the fact that business cycles are highly
correlated in the EU. We tend towards the second interpretation because during most of the esti-
mation period the UK labour market was not flexible it takes a long time for firms in continental
Europe to reduce their workforce. The results displayed in table 1b tend to confirm that there is a
strong European business cycle behind the results in table 1a. In first differences only one country
shows an impact for variable EXPCONTRDIFF and the number increases only to 3 for the vari-
able DEXPGDPDIFF. In levels there are, however, substantially more significant entries.
The impact of U.K. exports is one of the strongest effects found in the entire sample. For the
other countries, the contribution of export shocks to unemployment was even smaller. In the case
of Italy, but sometimes also for other countries, the weak correlation that actually appears in some- 14 -
cases has the wrong sign; i.e. increases in export demand are associated with increases in unem-
ployment. This is probably just a spurious correlation.
Tables 1a and 1b also suggest that for some of the core countries (D, BE, FR), trade has a signifi-
cant influence on unemployment, at least if one looks mainly at the first four columns. At first
sight, this might contradict the perceived wisdom that these countries are best suited for EMU. A
look at the individual regression results reveals, however, that the majority of cases in Tab. 1a
give similar results as the ones for the U.K. shown above in the sense that only the coefficient on
the contemporaneous change in exports (ß0) was significant, whereas changes in exports one year
earlier did not have an impact on unemployment. This contemporaneous correlation probably
simply reflects the greater correlation in business cycles within this group of countries. The quar-
terly data used by Gros (1996) confirms this interpretation. A further confirmation comes from
the fact that almost all of the significant contemporaneous coefficients reported in Table 1a disap-
pear in Table 1b which takes out the European business cycle by using the differences with the
EU average.
Using the residuals from the export demand equations as export demand shocks (RESEXPECUF
and RESEXPGDPF) does not affect the main conclusions, i.e. that the impact of export shocks
on unemployment is weak and in more than half of the cases even insignificant.
b. Employment in Manufacturing
To test for robustness of the above results we apply the same methodology described above to
manufacturing employment in several EU-countries. Thus, we circumvent the well-known weak-
nesses of the unemployment rate to reflect excess supply on labour markets correctly. Moreover,
we take account of the hypothesis claimed by Decressin and Fatàs (1995) that in the EU (in con-
trast to the U.S.) asymmetric external shocks that affect the demand for labor lead to changes in
labour force participation rather than to migration of labour at least at the regional level. If em-
ployment is to a greater extent influenced by shocks to export demand than unemployment, this
should be an important empirical hint at the validity of this hypothesis. Manufacturing was used
because it provides most of traded goods and should react more strongly to external shocks. In
order to be allowed to use the standard t- and F-distributions we again have to use changes of
manufacturing employment EMPLMAN as the levels are clearly non-stationary (see Annex 3).
The respective results are shown in Tables 2a and 2b.- 15 -
Table 2a - Summary results for manufacturing employment growth
as a function of export performance (OLS)
Ind.
Var.
D(EXPECU) D(EXPGDPEU) D(EXPGDP) D(EXPCONTR) RESEXPECUF RESEXPGDPF




(0) 0.297** (-1)  0.300**
DK (-1) -0.886** (0) -0.855*** (0)  -0.357** (-1) -0.849**
ES (-1) -0.391**
FR (0) 1.544*** (0) 0.656** (-1)  0.197** (-1)  1.127**
GR not available
IR (-1) 0.260** (-2) 0.321** (-2)  0.437**
IT (-1) 0.185*** (-1)  2.000*** (-1) 0.588* (-1) 1.20*** (-1) 0.175** (-1)  1.948***
NL (-1) 0.251*** (-2) -0.266* (-2) -0.210* (0)  0.349**
(-1) 0.452***
(-2) -0.238*
PO (0) 0.097** (0)  0.665*** (0)  0.467*** (0)  0.293** (-1)  0.957***
UK (0) 0.719*** (0)  0.648* (0)  1.591***
(-1) 1.043*
(0) 0.4247*




(0) 0.240*** (0)   0.662*
(-2)  0.656**
Note: For notes see Tab. 1a.- 16 -
Table 2b - Summary results for differences (with European average)
of manufacturing employment (growth and levels) as a function of export performance (OLS)
Depend. var. Changes in employment differences Employment differences
Indep.var. EXPCONTRDIFF DEXPGDPDIFF DEXPECUDIFF EXPCONTRDIFF EXPGDPDIFF
BE (-2) 0.326*** (-1)  0.170** (-2) 0.204** (0) 0.323*** (0)   0.382***
(-1) -0.149*
DK (0)  -1.196***
(-2) -1.316***
(0)  -0.478* (0) -0.330** (-1) 0.910** (0)  -0.489**
(-1)  1.3025***
ES (0)  -1.097** (0)  -2.102***
(-2) -2.095***
(0) -0.326** (-1) -1.313**
(-2)  1.814**
FR (0)   0.757** (-1) -0.458* (0)  0.710**
(-1) 0.955***
GR not available
IR (-2)  0.571*** (-1) 0.213**
(-2) 0.194*
(-2) 0.190** (-2) 0.904*** (0)  -0.266**
(-1)  0.542***
IT (-1)  0.652*** (0) -0.377*
(-1) 0.391*
(-1) 0.141** (-1) 0.414** (-1)  0.285***
NL (0) -0.358*** (-2) 0.254*** (0) -0.348***
(-2) 0.422***
PO (-2) -0.495** (-2) -0.571*** (-2) 0.345** (-2) -0.177*
UK (0)   0.838** (0)   0.448*
WD (0)   0.553**
(-2) -0.542**
(-1)  0.555** (0) 0.205** (0) 0.794*** (-2) 0.551***
Note: For notes see Tab. 1b. Because of limited data availability the sample range does not always cover the whole
time span of 1960-1996.
Tables 2a and 2b clearly reveal more significant entries than Tables 1a and 1b. Unfortunately,
however, in Table 2b 20 of the significant entries have the wrong (negative) sign against 32 with
the correct sign.
The coefficients reported in Tables 2a and 2b are generally larger in absolute values than those of
Tables 1a and 1b, as one would expect given that manufacturing produces mostly tradable goods.
However, if one takes into account that manufacturing represents only about 20 % of overall em-
ployment the coefficients in Tables 1 and 2 become comparable under the hypothesis that external
shocks impact mainly on manufacturing employment and that labour supply is constant in the
short run. The latter translates (5:1) into economy-wide unemployment rates assuming that em-
ployment in the rest of the economy is not affected and the supply of labour is constant.11
                                           
11 How can one compare the coefficients on unemployment (a rate) with the ones on employment growth? As-
sume that total employment, N, is given by the sum of employment in the manufacturing sector, Nm, and em-
ployment in the services sector, Ns. The unemployment rate UE is then given by:
() [] UE L NN L sm =- + /.- 17 -
With respect to e.g. the first column in Table 1b, the strongest influence of exports on manufac-
turing employment can again be found in the case of the U.K. While the influence of exports turns
out to be marginal in many countries it is more important for the U.K. as will be apparent from
the regression results that are presented as an example below (significance levels in parenthesis).
The first regression on annual data for the U.K. (1960-96) gave the following result:
det = -1.92 + 0.41*det-1 - 0.19*det-2
          (0.03)   (0.03)          (0.29),
with a standard error of regression of 2.71.
The second regression gave the following result:
det =-4.73 + 0.42*det-1 - 0.14*det-2 + 0.72*dexpt
         (0.00)      (0.00)         (0.15)           (0.00),
with a standard error of regression 1.54.
One way to measure the influence of exports is to look at the part of the variability of manufac-
turing employment that can be explained by export shocks. These results show that the standard
deviation of the index of manufacturing employment (after accounting for its own past) is 2.708
percentage points. Introducing the best performing measure of exports performance (the change
in real exports), it drops to 1.538 percentage points, or by about 43%. This means that for the
U.K., export shocks had a substantial effect on manufacturing employment, i.e. employment in the
tradeable sector. However, in many other countries the part of the variability of manufacturing
employment that can be explained by external shocks looks much smaller.
The coefficient on the contemporaneous change in exports implies that a one percentage increase
in the growth rate of exports (say from 9 to 10%) is associated with an increase in U.K. manu-
facturing employment of 0.72 percentage points (e.g. the index would go from 100 to 100.72 per-
centage points). For many of the remaining countries, however, this impact appears to be smaller.
IV. Robustness
a. The Influence of the Exchange Rate
The weak relationship between export earnings and unemployment could be explained in a number
of ways. A first objection would be that actual export shocks are determined by shocks to supply
as well as demand. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see why export supply should be subject to large
shocks that act within one year or one quarter. The capital stock and even labour inputs move
                                                                                                                                            
If the labour force, L, is constant and external shocks only affect employment in manufacturing the change in
unemployment rate, DUE, is then given by the proportional change in manufacturing employment, DNs times
the share of manufacturing employment in the labour force:  () ( ) DUE DN N L mm =- /.
Given that the share of employment in manufacturing in total employment is slightly above 20% a value of 0.2
for Nm/L seems appropriate. The difference between Nm/(Nm+Ns) and (Nm/L) is small at normal unemployment
rates. This would imply that the coefficient on manufacturing employment should be about 5 times as large as
that on unemployment.- 18 -
only slowly and technology does not make jumps. By contrast, it is much easier to imagine rea-
sons why export demand should be unstable: the business cycle abroad can move rapidly or the
demand for specific types of investment goods can change suddenly.
Another argument could be that the absence of a clear relationship between unemployment and
export shocks is due to a consistent policy that on average offsets the impact of export shocks by
using optimally some policy instrument, for example, the exchange rate (or fiscal resp. monetary
policy, see the estimations below).
In principle, this last point could be taken into account, although the degree to which the ex-
change rate was used as an adjustment instrument varied enormously over the last 30 years. The
degree of wage flexibility might also have varied considerably, but it is difficult to find any suc-
cinct measure of this latter variable. This aspect was therefore not used in the empirical analysis.
The crude tests on the annual data reported below, however, suggest that this factor cannot have
been responsible for the results so far.
Exchange rate adjustments should thus be incorporated in the analysis. Otherwise, one could ar-
gue that the absence of an effect of export shocks on unemployment is due to the fact that during
part of the period used in this investigation (1960-96) exchange rates were flexible. One way to
test this conjecture is to add (changes in) the real exchange rate among the determinants of unem-
ployment. This conjecture could not be rejected, if both exports and real effective exchange rates
become highly significant once implemented simultaneously. Table 3a reports the results with an-
nual data obtained using a similar approach as the one used to measure the importance of shocks
to exports: the change of the real exchange rate is included among the variables explaining
changes in unemployment. In Table 3a, the expected sign of exports is negative and that one of
the real effective exchange rate is positive. The specification of the underlying equations has again
been based on the usual diagnostic tests combined with the Schwarz-criterion. I.e. the regression
which reveals the lowest SCH-value (given the same number of observations) and at the same
time fulfills the usual diagnostic criteria is chosen as a reference. Whether we used levels or first
differences of the respective time series was dependent on the results of the respective stationarity
tests (McKinnon 1991, Phillips and Perron 1988).12 We applied this procedure also to Tables 3c
to 3f.
                                           
12 The test results are available from the authors if they are not listed in annex 3.- 19 -
Table 3a - Change in unemployment as a function of its own history, the change in real exports
and the change in real effective exchange rates (OLS)
Country Change in unemployment
(lags)
Change in real exports
(ECU 1990) (lags)
Change in real effective
exchange rates (lags)
BE (-1)*** (0) -0.04* (­) (0) 0.01
DK (-1)*** (-1) -0.06 (­) (0) -0.05** (-2) 0.06**
ES (-1)*** (-2)*** (0) -0.04 (­) (-1) -0.04
FR (-1) (0) -0.03* (¯) (-1) -0.01
GR (-1)*** (-2)** (-1) -0.00 (¯) (-1 ) 0.02*
IR (-1)*** (-1) -0.02 (­) (0) -0.01
IT (-1) -0.02 (¯) (0) -0.06***
NL (-1)** (0) -0.02 (­) (-1) 0.04**
PO (-1)*** (0) 0.01 (¯) (-2) 0.02**
UK (-1)*** (-2)*** (0) -0.09** (¯) (0) 0.01
WD (-1)*** (-2)*** (0) -0.06*** (-1) 0.05*** (®) (0) 0.02
Note: The table summarises results from regressions on annual data (1960-1996); */**/*** indicates significance
at a=0.1/0.05/0.01. ­ (¯) means that the coefficient becomes more (less) significant than in the respective equation
without the real effective exchange rate. Additional country-specific dummies were included when necessary.
One finds that changes in the (real) exchange rate also do not significantly affect unemployment.
The real exchange rate has a significant and unambigious positive impact on unemployment (once
one takes into account past unemployment) only for Greece (*), the Netherlands (**) and Portu-
gal (**). In no case case both the (change in) real exports and the real exchange rates are signifi-
cant. Nor has the significance of (the change in) exports increased under these limitations.
These results were obtained by just adding actual changes in the real exchange rate as one of the
determinants of unemployment. The use of actual exchange rate changes implies that one does not
measure only the relevance of the exchange rate as a policy instrument. Under floating rates, ex-
change rates are determined by many factors and do not always move in the direction wanted by
policy-makers. The fluctuations of the Italian lire starting in 1992 is only the most recent example.
The results reported in Table 3a thus indicate that either exchange rates are not a major policy in-
strument or that, if they move for other reasons, they did not have a major impact on unemploy-
ment (Belke 1996). The argument that the exchange rate instrument was used up to now to offset
shocks to export demand that would otherwise have resulted in unemployment is thus not sup-
ported by the empirical evidence.
The above results -in the same way as Tables 1a and 1b- again reveal a rather small influence of
exchange rates on unemployment. This is understandable if one takes into account that the ratio
of exports to GDP in the larger countries is around 25 to 30% and that the price elasticity of ex-
ports is about one-half. These two numbers imply that a 10% depreciation (in real terms) in-
creases GDP by between 1.25 to 1.5%. Furthermore, one has to take into account "Okun's law"
which calls for around 3% growth in real income in order to reduce unemployment by one per-
centage point. The reduction in unemployment that could be achieved by a 10% devaluation is- 20 -
only 0.4 to 0.5 percentage points. Unless exchange rate movements are very large, they are un-
likely to have a strong impact on unemployment.
In Table 3b, whose underlying regressions simply substitute employment for unemployment, the
expected sign of exports is positive and that one of the real effective exchange rate is negative.
The corresponding results are tabulated below.
Table 3b - Change in employment in manufacturing as a function of its own history,
the change in real exports and the change in real effective exchange rates (OLS)
Country Change in employment (lags) Change in real exports
 (ECU 1990) (lags)
Change in real effective
exchange rates (lags)
BE (-1)*** (0) 0.20** (­) (-1) -0.11*
DK (-1) (-2) -0.23* (­) (0) 0.23**
ES (-1) (-1) -0.17 (¯) (0) 0.48***
FR (-1)*** (0) 0.11 (¯) (0) 0.03
GR
IR (-1)*** (-2) 0.12* (­) (-1) -0.22**
IT (-1)*** (-1) 0.16** (¯) (-1) -0.09
NL (-1)*** (-1) 0.28*** (­) (-2) -0.05
PO (-1)*** (-1) 0.05 (¯) (-1) -0.13**
UK (-1)*** (-2) (0) 0.69*** (®) (-1) -0.04
WD (-1)*** (-2)*** (0) 0.25*** (®) (0) 0.07
Note: The table summarises results from regressions on annual data (1960-1996); */**/*** indicates significance
at a=0.1/0.05/0.01. ­ (¯) means that the coefficient becomes more (less) significant than in the respective equation
without the real effective exchange rate. Additional country-specific dummies were included when necessary.
On the basis of Table 3b nearly the same story as with respect to Tab. 3a emerges. The estimated
impacts of exports on employment as shown in Tab. 2a are not dramatically altered by the inclu-
sion of the real effective exchange rate. The magnitude of coefficient estimates appears to be un-
affected. In only two cases (Denmark and Ireland) the inclusion of the real effective exchange rate
leads to an increase in number of *'s, i.e. a stepwise increase in the significance level. However, in
two other cases (Italy and Portugal) the number of *'s, i.e. the significance levels, even shrinks.
Moreover, the estimations for Denmark result in wrong signs for exports and for the real effective
exchange rate. Again, the argument that the exchange rate instrument was used to neutralize
shocks to export demand that would otherwise have resulted in lower employment (or moved as a
'shock absorber' in reaction to distortions on labor markets) is not corroborated by the empirical
evidence.
Another argument for the absence of a clear relationship between (un-) employment and export
shocks might be a consistent fiscal or monetary policy that on average reacts to and manages to
offset the impact of export shocks. This hypothesis is tested empirically in the following chapters
b and c. Since this is done along the lines already used above in this chapter, comments are held
rather scarce. We proceed with tests of the shock absorbing impact of fiscal policy.- 21 -
b. The Influence of Fiscal Policy
According to our hypothesis, the expected sign of exports in the unemployment regressions is
negative and that of government deficit (deficits have a negative, surpluses a positive sign) is
positive. The corresponding results are shown in Table 3c.
Table 3c - Change in unemployment as a function of its own history,
the change in real exports and the change in fiscal policy (OLS)
Country Change in unemployment
(lags)
Change in real exports
(ECU 1990) (lags)
Change in government deficit
(lags)
BE (-1)*** (0) -0.05** (­) (0) -0.14** (-1) -0.09**
DK (-1)* (-1)-0.05 (­) (0) -0.20*** (-1) -0.09*
ES (-1)*** (-2)*** (-1) -0.03 (¯) (0) -0.42*** (-2) -0.89***
FR (-1)*** (0) -0.01 (¯) (0) -0.28***
GR
IR (-1)*** (-1) -0.02 (­) (-1) -0.14**
IT (-1)* (-2) -0.03** (­) (0) -0.08
NL (-1)*** (-1) 0.02 (­) (0) -0.19**
PO (-1)*** (-1) -0.01 (¯) (0) 0.02
UK (-1)*** (-2)*** (0) -0.10*** (®) (-2) -0.09
WD (-1)*** (-2)*** (0) -0.06*** (-1) 0.05*** (®) (-2) -0.05
Note: The table summarises results from regressions on annual data (1960-1996); */**/*** indicates significance
at a=0.1/0.05/0.01. ­ (¯) means that the coefficient becomes more (less) significant than in the respective equation
without the proxy for fiscal policy. Additional country-specific dummies were included when necessary.
With respect to employment regressions, the expected sign of exports is positive and that of gov-
ernment deficit (deficits have a negative sign) is negative (Table 3d).- 22 -
Table 3d - Change in employment in manufacturing as a function of its own history,
 the change in real exports and the change in fiscal policy (OLS)
Country Change in employment (lags) Change in real exports
(ECU 1990) (lags)
Change in government deficit
(lags)
BE (-1)*** (0) 0.15** (­) (0) 0.82***
DK (-1) (-2) -0.19* (­) (0) 0.79***
ES (-1)** (0) -0.11 (¯) (0) 0.85**
FR (-1)*** (-1) 0.11 (­) (0) 0.80***
GR
IR (-1) 0.48*** (-2) 0.09 (¯) (-1) 0.32
IT (-1)*** (-1) 0.16*** (®) (0) 0.84***
NL (-1)*** (-1) 0.27*** (®) (-2) 0.27
PO (-1)*** (0) 0.10** (®) (-1) 0.15
UK (-1)*** (-2) (0) 0.68*** (®) (0) 0.28
WD (-1)*** (-2)*** (0) 0.25*** (®) (-1) 0.17
Note: The table summarises results from regressions on annual data (1960-1996); */**/*** indicates significance
at a=0.1/0.05/0.01. ­ (¯) means that the coefficient becomes more (less) significant than in the respective equation
without the proxy for fiscal policy. Additional country-specific dummies were included when necessary.
With respect to Table 3c, only in the cases of Belgium and Italy exports gain some significance.
However, for Belgium the coefficient of fiscal policy does not reveal the expected sign and in the
case of Italy it is even not significant. According to Table 3d, only for Denmark the significance of
exports increases, but with the wrong sign.
Throughout the Tables 3c and 3d, the coefficient of GOVDEF (+ means net lending, - net bor-
rowing) does not reveal the sign expected by those preferring a counter-cyclical interpretation. In
contrast to the latter, these results possibly indicate that government deficits have increased for
other reasons than export demand shocks. Another interpretation might be that there have not
been many significant (asymmetric) export shocks to which government deficits could have re-
jected in a systematic manner. To summarise, the hypothesis that fiscal policy was used up to now
to offset shocks to export demand that would otherwise have resulted in unemployment or losses
in employment is not accepted by the data. Let us now turn to the tests of the relevance of the last
potential 'shock absorber', monetary policy. For this purpose, we use the same procedure as with
respect to exchange rates and fiscal policy.
c. The Influence of Monetary Policy
The corresponding results for unemployment are displayed in Table 3e, those for employment in
Table 3f. In Table 3e (3f), the expected sign of exports and that of the indicator of the monetary
policy stance, the (stationary level of the) interest rate spread, are both negative (positive).- 23 -
Table 3e - Change in unemployment as a function of its own history,
the change in real exports and the change in monetary policy (OLS)
Country Change in unemployment
(lags)
Change in real exports
(ECU 1990) (lags)
Spread (Lags)
BE (-1)*** (0) -0.03 (¯) (-1) -0.05
DK (-1) (-1) -0.04 (­) (0) -0.04
ES (-1)*** (-2)** (-2) 0.14 (­) (-1) -0.71***
FR (-1) (0) -0.04** (­) (-1) -0.10*
GR
IR (-1)*** (0) -0.03 (­) (-2) -0.31***
IT (-1)* (-2)** (0) 0.04*** (­) (-1) -0.09***
NL (-1)*** (0) -0.09*** (­) (0) 0.24*** (-1) -0.16*
PO (-1)*** (0) -0.05 (¯) (0) -0.13**
UK (-1)*** (-2)** (0) -0.10*** (®) (-1) -0.04
WD (-1)*** (0) -0.05*** (®)
(-1) 0.02*
(-1) -0.19***
Note: The table summarises results from regressions on annual data (1960-1996); */**/*** indicates significance
at a=0.1/0.05/0.01. ­ (¯) means that the coefficient becomes more (less) significant than in the respective equation
without the proxy for monetary policy. Additional country-specific dummies were included when necessary. These
notes also refer to Tab. 3e.
The coefficient estimates of exports roughly stay the same as without implementing a monetary
policy variable. Moreover, only for Italy and the Netherlands the numbers of *'s could be en-
hanced, i.e. the inclusion of monetary policy leads to a better fit of exports in the unemployment
regression.
Table 3f - Change in employment in manufacturing as a function of its own history,
the change in real exports and the change in monetary policy (OLS)- 24 -
Country Change in employment (lags) Change in real exports
(ECU 1990) (lags)
Spread (lags)
BE (-1)*** (-1) 0.15* (¯) (-1) 0.75***
DK (-1)* (-2) -0.16 (¯) (0) 0.39*
ES (-1)*** (-1) -0.37* (­) (0) 0.34
FR (-1)*** (0) 0.14* (­) (-1) 0.33*
GR
IR (-1)*** (-2) 0.32*** (­) (0) 0.37
IT (-1)*** (-1) 0.25*** (®) (-2) 0.15** (0) -0.44***
NL (-1)*** (0) 0.13* (¯) (-2) 0.56***
PO (-1) (0) 0.23** (­) (-2) 0.88***
UK (-1)*** (0) 0.74*** (®) (-1) 0.35***
WD (-1)*** (-2)*** (0) 0.21*** (®) (-1) 0.48**
Also with respect to employment, thus, the coefficient estimates of exports roughly stay the same
as without implementing a monetary policy variable. Moreover, only for Spain, France and Ireland
the numbers of *'s could be enhanced, i.e. the inclusion of monetary policy leads to a better fit of
exports in the unemployment regression. However, the significance level clearly decreases for
Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. According to both Tables 3e and 3f, the results for the
spread came out in most cases to be as theoretically expected. By this feature, a well-known prior
-the significance of the interest rate spread in forecasting equations for real activity- is empirically
corroborated by our estimates.
The argument that monetary policy reacted in the past to offset shocks to export demand that
would otherwise have resulted in unemployment or in losses in manufacturing employment is thus
not convincingly supported by the empirical evidence. That is to say, there might on the one hand
have been export shocks to which monetary policy reacted from time to time. On the other hand,
these export shocks neither occur frequently enough nor do they have a throughout significant
impact on (un-) employment.
All equations in Tables 3a to 3f have complementarily been estimated including the lowest number
of dummies necessary to fulfill the usual residual diagnostics. While ignoring the SCH-criterion in
this case, which in our case recommendates the implementation of more highly significant dum-
mies, the results nearly stay the same and are available from the authors on request.
d. The Simultaneous Impact of Potential Shock Absorbers
The tests for robustness of the (non-) relation between (un-)employment and export demand
shocks in chapter IV might be criticised for several reasons. For example, the data set and, there-
fore, the results might be infected by multicollinearity problems. The respective two explaining
variables -changes in exports and real exchange rates/government deficits/interest rate spread-
might have a simultaneous impact on each other from a theoretical point of view. On the one
hand, the exchange rate can move in reaction to export shocks. On the other hand, exchange rate
changes might influence the export demand. Though cross-correlations with few exceptions (U.K.- 25 -
and Portugal) indicate that there is nearly no significant relation between these variables, we pre-
fer to be careful: in case of multicollinearity, the insignificance of cross-correlations does not nec-
essarily indicate the absence of multicollinearity. By finding instruments for the respective vari-
ables in the following we try to lessen the problem of multicollinearity somewhat, if it should be
there. However, several arguments speak in favour of our procedure in chapter IV, even if there
(as always) is some degree of multicollinearity. First, coefficient estimates stay best linear unbi-
ased estimators. Second, since we regress changes on changes, common trends in the variables
mainly responsible for multicollinearity are to a large extent eliminated. Third, groups of regres-
sors -as is the aim of our study- continue to have their standard distributions. Thus, their signifi-
cance can be read off the regression output as before (Gujarati 1992, pp. 289 ff.).
A second objection weighs more heavily at first glance, if one abstracts from cases of high lags of
the explaining variables in Tables 3a to 3f. Since (un-) employment is regressed on export de-
mand, exchange rates, fiscal policy and monetary policy, potential simultaneity problems arise.
E.g., on the one hand, a change in exchange rates (indirectly) or in exports (directly) could influ-
ence (un-) employment. On the other hand, some theoretical models predict an exchange rate ad-
justment in cases of (un-) employment changes and -via the exchange rate channel- a change in
exports. If one for a moment neglects the failure of empirical studies in finding dominant short- or
mid-term real influences for exchange rate movements (Canzoneri, Vallés, Viñals 1996, Rose
1995), some of the right-hand variables in Tables 3a to 3f are endogenous and correlated with the
error. This means that OLS would lead to biased estimates. To test for the relevance of these
objections we run Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) on German data using the same set of vari-
ables as in Tables 3a and 3f. The procedure we implement could not be replicated for all the
countries for reasons of space. Germany was chosen because it is a key country.
We try to define variables (instruments) which are uncorrelated with the residual and at the same
time serve to find the component of the potentially endogenous variables exchange rate, fiscal
policy and monetary policy that is attributable to the instrument. As instruments besides the pre-
determined exogenous variables we choose an EMS-Dummy EMS, the change in the U.S. nomi-
nal short-term interest rate D(USINTS), the change in intra-EU imports of goods at current prices
D(IMPEU) and the change in the general government structural balance D(WDGOVDEFC). As
shown in the following tables, the instruments in each case satisfy the order and the rank condition
for identification and include lagged endogenous (and exogenous) variables to get consistent es-
timates. With respect to unemployment and manufacturing employment we proceed as follows.
As a first step, we run TSLS-regressions as in Tables 3a to 3f separately for each pair of an export
shock and a potential shock absorber (exchange rate or fiscal policy or monetary policy). As a
second step, we use TSLS incorporating all three potential shock absorbers simultaneously.
The corresponding estimation results for unemployment are shown in Tables 4a to 4d, those for
employment in Tables 5a to 5d. The results reveal the minor importance of export demand shocks
(insignificance and or a small significant coefficient). Only in two cases (5c and 5d) are the coeffi-
cient of exports and that of a shock absorber (here: SPREADWD) simultaneously significant,
both revealing the correct sign. As above, the only more or less significant shock absorber is the- 26 -
SPREAD, i.e. monetary policy. This corresponds to our prior. The TSLS estimations, therefore,
suggest that the examined pootential shock absorbers (with the exception perhaps of monetary
policy and employment) cannot have been responsible for the results so far. However, as in the
preceding examinations in chapter III, export demand shocks seem to be more significant with re-
spect to employment in manufacturing than for unemployment. On the whole, our results gained
in chapters IVa to IVc are impressively corroborated.- 27 -
Tab. 4a - Change in German unemployment as a function of its own history,
the change in real exports, and the change in real effective exchange rates (TSLS)
TSLS // Dependent Variable is DWDUE
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1994
Included observations: 32 after adjusting endpoints
Instrument list: C DWDUE(-1) DWDUE(-2)  DWDEXPECU(-1)
                         DDEREER(-1) EMS D(IMPEU) D(USINTS)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic   Prob.
C -0.031131  0.251154 -0.123953  0.9023
DWDUE(-1)  0.841791  0.260643  3.229671  0.0035
DWDUE(-2) -0.362019  0.185521 -1.951365  0.0623
DWDEXPECU -0.028410  0.026677 -1.064985  0.2971
DWDEXPECU(-1)  0.050336  0.023833  2.112052  0.0448
DDEREER -0.016294  0.085983 -0.189501  0.8512
DDEREER(-1)  0.020765  0.024382  0.851670  0.4025
R-squared  0.582742     Mean dependent var  0.194184
Adjusted R-squared  0.482601     S.D. dependent var  0.681623
S.E. of regression  0.490295     Akaike info criterion -1.234857
Sum squared resid  6.009724     Schwarz criterion -0.914227
F-statistic  5.204842     Durbin-Watson stat  1.927098
Prob(F-statistic)  0.001352
Tab. 4b - Change in German unemployment as a function of its own history,
the change in real exports, and the change in fiscal policy(TSLS)
TSLS // Dependent Variable is DWDUE
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1994
Included observations: 32 after adjusting endpoints
Instrument list: C   DWDUE(-1) DWDUE(-2) DWDEXPECU(-1)
                        D(WDGOVDEF(-1))  D(WDGOVDEFC) D(IMPEU)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic   Prob.
C  0.154993  0.282352  0.548935  0.5879
DWDUE(-1)  0.914581  0.213573  4.282290  0.0002
DWDUE(-2) -0.595783  0.229778 -2.592858  0.0157
DWDEXPECU -0.057101  0.035061 -1.628632  0.1159
DWDEXPECU(-1)  0.056125  0.029467  1.904687  0.0684
D(WDGOVDEF)  0.155552  0.121176  1.283681  0.2110
D(WDGOVDEF(-1))  0.079663  0.086567  0.920253  0.3662
R-squared  0.462950     Mean dependent var  0.194184
Adjusted R-squared  0.334058     S.D. dependent var  0.681623
S.E. of regression  0.556240     Akaike info criterion -0.982469
Sum squared resid  7.735085     Schwarz criterion -0.661840
F-statistic  4.334800     Durbin-Watson stat  2.054864
Prob(F-statistic)  0.003942- 28 -
Tab. 4c - Change in German unemployment as a function of its own history,
the change in real exports, and the change in monetary policy (TSLS)
TSLS // Dependent Variable is DWDUE
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1994
Included observations: 32 after adjusting endpoints
Instrument list: C   DWDUE(-1) DWDUE(-2) DWDEXPECU(-1)
                        SPREADWD(-1) D(WDGOVDEF)  D(IMPEU)  D(USINTS)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic   Prob.
C  0.384724  0.233207  1.649708  0.1115
DWDUE(-1)  0.625819  0.190317  3.288291  0.0030
DWDUE(-2) -0.097999  0.166769 -0.587634  0.5620
DWDEXPECU -0.034797  0.025546 -1.362103  0.1853
DWDEXPECU(-1)  0.024122  0.020369  1.184236  0.2475
SPREADWD -0.028964  0.097831 -0.296058  0.7696
SPREADWD(-1) -0.184280  0.076665 -2.403693  0.0240
R-squared  0.696809     Mean dependent var  0.194184
Adjusted R-squared  0.624044     S.D. dependent var  0.681623
S.E. of regression  0.417939     Akaike info criterion -1.554199
Sum squared resid  4.366827     Schwarz criterion -1.233569
F-statistic  9.040921     Durbin-Watson stat  1.932187
Tab. 4d - Change in German unemployment as a function of its own history,
the change in real exports, and the change in all shock absorbers (TSLS)
TSLS // Dependent Variable is DWDUE
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1994
Included observations: 32 after adjusting endpoints
Instrument list: C DWDUE(-1) DWDUE(-2)  DWDEXPECU(-1)
        DDEREER(-1) D(WDGOVDEF(-1)) SPREADWD(-1) EMS D(IMPEU)
        D(USINTS) D(WDGOVDEFC)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic   Prob.
C  0.569848  0.245416  2.321962  0.0283
DWDUE(-1)  0.948452  0.225555  4.204977  0.0003
DWDEXPECU -0.037448  0.031871 -1.175009  0.2506
DDEREER  0.019096  0.037367  0.511031  0.6136
D(WDGOVDEF) -0.149834  0.098806 -1.516449  0.1415
SPREADWD -0.337551  0.096531 -3.496833  0.0017
R-squared  0.465899     Mean dependent var  0.194184
Adjusted R-squared  0.363187     S.D. dependent var  0.681623
S.E. of regression  0.543939     Akaike info criterion -1.050475
Sum squared resid  7.692614     Schwarz criterion -0.775650
F-statistic  6.255275     Durbin-Watson stat  2.143991
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000619- 29 -
Tab. 5a - Change in German manufacturing employment as a function of its own history, the
change in real exports, and the change in real effective exchange rates (TSLS)
TSLS // Dependent Variable is D(EMPLMANWD)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1994
Included observations: 32 after adjusting endpoints
Instrument list: C D(EMPLMANWD(-1)) D(EMPLMANWD(-2))
                        DWDEXPECU(-1)  DDEREER(-1) EMS D(IMPEU) D(USINTS)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic   Prob.
C -0.850998  1.310993 -0.649125  0.5222
D(EMPLMANWD(-1))  0.918393  0.422922  2.171544  0.0396
D(EMPLMANWD(-2)) -0.579406  0.283849 -2.041246  0.0519
DWDEXPECU  0.197383  0.143995  1.370761  0.1826
DWDEXPECU(-1) -0.100891  0.127833 -0.789243  0.4374
DDEREER -0.243914  0.614459 -0.396958  0.6948
DDEREER(-1) -0.058501  0.140920 -0.415137  0.6816
R-squared  0.220425     Mean dependent var -0.701426
Adjusted R-squared  0.033328     S.D. dependent var  2.640198
S.E. of regression  2.595829     Akaike info criterion  2.098452
Sum squared resid  168.4582     Schwarz criterion  2.419082
F-statistic  3.005442     Durbin-Watson stat  1.909820
Prob(F-statistic)  0.023720
Tab. 5b - Change in German manufacturing employment as a function of its own history, the
change in real exports, and the change in fiscal policy (TSLS)
TSLS // Dependent Variable is D(EMPLMANWD)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1994
Included observations: 32 after adjusting endpoints
Instrument list: C D(EMPLMANWD(-1)) D(EMPLMANWD(-2))
        DWDEXPECU(-1)  D(WDGOVDEF(-1))  D(IMPEU) D(WDGOVDEFC)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic   Prob.
C -1.395831  1.049449 -1.330061  0.1955
D(EMPLMANWD(-1))  0.741224  0.209581  3.536700  0.0016
D(EMPLMANWD(-2)) -0.656548  0.235851 -2.783746  0.0101
DWDEXPECU  0.267895  0.134706  1.988735  0.0578
DWDEXPECU(-1) -0.127802  0.115580 -1.105747  0.2794
D(WDGOVDEF) -0.404327  0.474146 -0.852749  0.4019
D(WDGOVDEF(-1)) -0.164562  0.359862 -0.457293  0.6514
R-squared  0.476974     Mean dependent var -0.701426
Adjusted R-squared  0.351448     S.D. dependent var  2.640198
S.E. of regression  2.126223     Akaike info criterion  1.699334
Sum squared resid  113.0206     Schwarz criterion  2.019964
F-statistic  4.272476     Durbin-Watson stat  1.867949
Prob(F-statistic)  0.004269- 30 -
Tab. 5c - Change in German manufacturing employment as a function of its own history, the
change in real exports, and the change in monetary policy (TSLS)
TSLS // Dependent Variable is D(EMPLMANWD)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1994
Included observations: 32 after adjusting endpoints
Instrument list: C   D(EMPLMANWD(-1)) D(EMPLMANWD(-2))
        DWDEXPECU(-1)  SPREADWD(-1) D(WDGOVDEF)  D(IMPEU)
        D(USINTS)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic   Prob.
C -1.895826  0.872212 -2.173583  0.0394
D(EMPLMANWD(-1))  0.643553  0.158885  4.050430  0.0004
D(EMPLMANWD(-2)) -0.358624  0.141847 -2.528249  0.0182
DWDEXPECU  0.195071  0.100583  1.939404  0.0638
DWDEXPECU(-1) -0.037806  0.077361 -0.488699  0.6293
SPREADWD -0.232137  0.330427 -0.702536  0.4888
SPREADWD(-1)  0.729043  0.244198  2.985454  0.0063
R-squared  0.708627     Mean dependent var -0.701426
Adjusted R-squared  0.638697     S.D. dependent var  2.640198
S.E. of regression  1.586982     Akaike info criterion  1.114309
Sum squared resid  62.96283     Schwarz criterion  1.434938
F-statistic  9.538972     Durbin-Watson stat  1.847064
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000017
Tab. 5d - Change in German Manufacturing employment as a function of its own history, the
change in real exports, and the change in all shock absorbers (TSLS)
TSLS // Dependent Variable is D(EMPLMANWD)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1994
Included observations: 32 after adjusting endpoints
Instrument list: C D(EMPLMANWD(-1)) D(EMPLMANWD(-2))
        DWDEXPECU(-1)  DDEREER(-1) D(WDGOVDEF(-1))
        SPREADWD(-1)  D(WDGOVDEFC) D(IMPEU)EMS D(USINTS)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic    Prob.
C -2.344141  0.697381 -3.361350  0.0025
D(EMPLMANWD(-1))  0.672837  0.139118  4.836451  0.0001
D(EMPLMANWD(-2)) -0.359497  0.150123 -2.394688  0.0245
DWDEXPECU  0.206699  0.095040  2.174858  0.0393
DDEREER(-1) -0.050774  0.067070 -0.757029  0.4561
D(WDGOVDEF) -0.169493  0.333393 -0.508390  0.6156
SPREADWD(-1)  0.673775  0.228095  2.953916  0.0067
R-squared  0.666881     Mean dependent var -0.701426
Adjusted R-squared  0.586932     S.D. dependent var  2.640198
S.E. of regression  1.696864     Akaike info criterion  1.248203
Sum squared resid  71.98367     Schwarz criterion  1.568833
F-statistic  8.425235     Durbin-Watson stat  1.660067
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000047
Experimenting with other instruments for the government deficit, as e.g. government receipts ex-
cluding social security contributions, led to similar results but to a shorter sample period. For this- 31 -
reason, they are not tabulated here. Strikingly, different export definitions gave rise to the same
kind of results.
V. Interpretation
The results so far suggest that it is difficult to identify the size of the impact of the standard
shocks considered in the OCA literature (i.e. shocks to exports) on the evolution of unemploy-
ment in Europe and that fixing exchange rates is ceteris paribus not likely to make a difference in
this respect. But could one not argue that there might be other types of shocks, which are empiri-
cally more important for unemployment and that could be better managed with flexible exchange
rates? Shocks to investment constitute an obvious candidate given the high variability of this
component of aggregate demand13 and it is widely assumed that they constitute a major determi-
nant of the business cycle. We therefore applied our simple methodology to this case to find out
whether investment is an important determinant of unemployment. The results are interesting be-
cause they are so different from the ones for export shocks.
Table 6 below shows the results of the same simple regressions as above: the growth rate of
investment (gross fixed capital formation in constant prices) is used an explanatory variable
besides significant past values of the (change in the) unemployment rate. The contrast with table
1a, which contains the results for export shocks, is clear: we find that for all the 11 countries
considered here the growth of investment has an influence on unemployment that is in most cases
significant at the 1 % level. (Since investment is notoriously difficult to forecast, the actual growth
rates of investment are equivalent to shocks.) Our own findings thus confirm that investment is an
important determinant of the business cycle.
                                           
13 Once in a life-time major asymmetric demand shocks, such as German unification, might also require an ex-
change rate adjustment. For a critical view of this position see the empirical study on the 92/93 EMS crisis by
Belke 1996. However, we want to restrict our analysis to 'normal' shocks, i.e. shocks whose distribution can be
estimated on the basis of past data.- 32 -
Table 6a - Summary results for unemployment changes






BE (0) -0.069*** (0)  0.445***




FR (0) -0.070*** (0)  0.238***
GR n.a. n.a.
IR (0) -0.043*** (0)  0.153***
(-1) 0.110**
IT (0) -0.057*** (0)  0.205***
NL (0) -0.072*** (0)  0.176***
PO (0)  -0.020** (0)  0.121**
UK (0) -0.0791*** (0)  0.238**
WD (0)  -0.076*** (0)  0.278***
Note: Data source: European Commission. The table summarises results from regressions on annual data (1960-
1996); */**/*** indicates significance at a=0.1/0.05/0.01. Additional country-specific dummies were included
when necessary. Lag order of changes in investment in brackets. n.a.: not available.
Does the result that shocks to investment demand seem to have a clearly identifiable impact on
unemployment mean that the exchange rate might be useful after all to allow the national central
bank to offset them through the appropriate interest rate and/or exchange rate reaction.  In other
words, could EMU be costly because it does not allow countries to react with a national monetary
policy to idiosyncratic shocks to (domestic) investment? We would argue that this conclusion is
not warranted for two reasons, one theoretical and one empirical. To start with the latter: We
found above that the exchange rate is apparently not a potent factor in the determination of un-
employment, at least if considered alongside export shocks. Moreover and more important, the
inclusion of exchange rates and interest rates does not affect the result that export demand shocks
are not an important and easy to estimate determinant of unemployment. For the case of invest-
ment shocks we find the same result. Besides the fact that exchange rates do not seem to be a sig-
nificant determinant of unemployment, the inclusion of these monetary policy instruments does
not apear to affect the result that investment is an important determinant of unemployment. The
evidence even appears to be more pronounced than with respect to exports. The tables 7a and 7b
reveal that for the overwhelming majority of countries the significance of investment remains on
the same high level as without the implementation of real effective exchange rates. In three cases
it even increases, in only one marginal case -namely Denmark- it shrinks from one to five percent.
However, one might argue that at least the regressions containing both changes in investment and
the interest spread suffer from a simultaneous equation bias. For this reason, the OLS-results are
not presented here. However, the respective TSLS regressions are available on request.- 33 -
Table 7a - Change in unemployment as a unction of its own history, the change in investment
and the change in real effective exchange rates (OLS)
Country Change in unemployment
(lags)
Change in investment (lags) Change in real effective
exchange rates (lags)
BE (-1)*** (0) -0.07*** (®) (0) -0.004
DK (-1)** (0) -0.04** (¯) (0) -0.009
ES (-1)*** (-2)* (0) -0.11*** (®) (0) -0.023
FR (-1) (0) -0.07*** (®) (0) 0.012
GR n.a.
IR (-1)*** (0) -0.04*** (®) (-1) 0.038
IT (-1)** (0) -0.05*** (®) (0) -0.020
NL (-1)*** (0) -0.07*** (®) (-1) -0.020
PO (-1)*** (0) -0.02*** (­) (-2) 0.019**
UK (-1)*** (0) -0.10*** (®) (-1) 0.054***
WD (-1)*** (-2)*** (0) -0.08*** (®) (-2) -0.03**
Note: The table summarises results from regressions on annual data (1960-1996); */**/*** indicates significance
at a=0.1/0.05/0.01. ­ (¯) means that the coefficient becomes more (less) significant than in the respective equation
without the real effective exchange rate. Additional country-specific dummies were included when necessary. n.a.:
not available.
Table 7b - Change in employment in manufacturing as a function of its own history,
the change in investment and the change in real effective exchange rates (OLS)
Country Change in Employment (Lags) Change in Investment (Lags) Change in Real Effective Ex-
change Rates (Lags)
BE (-1)*** (0) 0.21*** (®) (-1) -0.105*
DK (-1)* (0) 0.20*** (®) (-1) -0.07
ES (0) 0.24*** (®) (0) 0.21**
FR (-1)*** (0) 0.2***  (®) (0) -0.05
GR n.a.
IR (-1) (0) 0.13*** (-1) 0.12*** (­) (-1) -0.14*
IT (-1)*** (0) 0.20*** (®) (-1) -0.10**
NL (-1)*** (0) 0.19*** (®) (0) -0.07
PO (-1)** (0) 0.16*** (­) (-1) -0.16***
UK (-1)*** (0) 0.20** (®) (-1) -0.16*
WD (-1)*** (-2)*** (0) 0.27*** (®) (-1) -0.08*
Note: The table summarises results from regressions on annual data (1960-1996); */**/*** indicates significance
at a=0.1/0.05/0.01. ­ (¯) means that the coefficient becomes more (less) significant than in the respective equation
without the real effective exchange rate. Additional country-specific dummies were included when necessary.
But there is also a second, more fundamental argument: in considering the use of the exchange
rate for demand management purposes one has to keep in mind that an exchange rate change
shifts demand from one country to another and thus always, at least partially, has a "beggar-thy-- 34 -
neighbour" effect. In order to decide whether it is in the interest of "Europe" to use (intra-
European) exchange rates to offset domestic demand shocks, one has to take this aspect into
account. The real issue is thus the optimal exchange rate policy from the point of view of the
welfare of the system. This issue cannot be addressed with the usual one-country models (which
prescribe an exchange rate adjustment in response to any internal shock - demand, supply or
other). One has to use a two-country model.
For example, Gros and Lane (1994) use a standard two-country model with short-term wage
rigidity to analyze optimal exchange rate policy in the presence of supply and demand shocks.
They find that the Pareto optimum (which happens to coincide with the Nash equilibrium) is to let
the exchange rate move in response to both shocks; but only if there are foreign shocks. This
result implies that if two countries have a similar structure, so that shocks to the relative price of
the goods they produce are unlikely, asymmetric shocks to domestic demand or supply are not a
reason to keep exchange rates flexible. Different models might lead to slightly different results,
but the basic intuition is likely to be robust to changes in the particular model used. From the
point of view of the system, there is no need to use exchange rates to distribute the impact of
local shocks to demand if countries produce and consume the same goods.
This argument that the effects of exchange rate changes on demand net out to zero at the global
level does not apply to shocks that affect trade directly. If demand shifts from one country to
another, an exchange rate adjustment is required from the point of view of both. Hence,
fluctuations in exports are the main source of shocks that should be taken into account to
ascertain the importance of exchange rate flexibility from a global point of view. Other legitimate
sources of shocks would be external shocks (like an oil price change) that have differential effects
because of differences in the importance of energy.
By contrast, one could imagine the case of a country which experiences a sudden fall in domestic
demand because the 'animal spirits' that drive investment turn sour or because households
suddenly save more. A depreciation would shift demand towards domestic goods and increase
exports, thus reducing the unemployment that would otherwise result from the drop in demand.
The "gain" in demand of the country experiencing the shock, however, would come at the
expense of the rest of the world. The country that depreciates would only export its
unemployment problems. From a global point of view, little would be gained from exchange rate
flexibility in this case.
But where do macroeconomic shocks come from? It is likely that policy itself is a source of
shocks. Policy shocks, e.g. changes in fiscal or other economic policies, affect overall demand and
thus also the exchange rate _ as could be observed in the case of the US dollar during the 1980s.
Nevertheless, policy shocks are not unavoidable and, as argued above, it is not always clear that
in this case an exchange rate adjustment is a desirable consequence from a global point of view.
It is difficult to imagine in concrete terms economy-wide shocks that are driven by sudden
changes in technology or tastes. While there might be sudden changes at the sectoral level,
experience indicates that these fundamental determinants of the economy tend to change slowly at
the aggregate level, which should give prices and wages enough time to adjust to maintain- 35 -
equilibrium. For example, the rise in the importance of the automobile industry or the decline of
railways took decades. These secular changes certainly caused severe adjustment problems, but
the argument that adjustments in the real exchange rate can be achieved more quickly through
changes in the nominal exchange rate loses its significance for trends that work over a decade or
more (Gros 1996).
VI. Conclusions
The main motive behind the empirical work undertaken here was to identify the magnitude of the
impact of external shocks on unemployment. This would have been a first step towards an esti-
mate of the cost EMU. However, we did not succeed.
The main finding of this paper is a negative one, i.e. that we have not been able to detect a robust
and statistically significant link between unemployment and external shocks. Different countries
show different results, which at times are affected by minor changes in the definition of external
shocks (e.g. growth of real exports versus the contribution of exports to overall demand growth).
Taking into account possible shock absorbers like exchange rate movements, fiscal policy and
monetary policy did not affect this result. A slightly different picture emerges for employment in
manufacturing. There is a much stronger link between this variable and export shocks, if meas-
ured by the magnitude of coefficients and significance level. This finding is, however, qualified by
TSLS estimations for Western Germany which a reveal rather small influences of export demand
shocks even on employment in manufacturing.
Given that most trade is in manufactured products it is not surprising that the relationship between
exports and manufacturing employment is much stronger than that with economy-wide unem-
ployment. However, even in this case the results are not sufficient to make any tentative estimate
of the cost of EMU for this sector of the economy because the sign of the correlation coefficients
was often the opposite of what one have expected on theoretical grounds.
A key for the interpretation of this negative result is the contrast with our findings concerning the
link between (un)employment and investment. Here we found a statistically significant relationship
that is robust and consistent across countries. This difference in the results suggest immediately
that hysteresis (Carlin and Soskice 1990) cannot be the reason of the absence of a correlation
between export shocks and (un)employment. If rigidities prevent adjustments until shocks become
very large, and if any adjustments that do take place are irreversible this should have the same
effect on the estimates concerning investment. But this is apparently not the case.
We believe that the negative finding of this paper concerning export shocks is important given the
way in which the optimum currency area approach has been used in the literature and the public
debate on EMU. The main argument against EMU has always been that it does not allow coun-
tries to adjust to external shocks via the exchange rate. We show that the data from the past 30
years in Europe does not show any strong link between external shocks and unemployment.
Hence we would argue that EMU is unlikely to lead to the serious unemployment problems that
have often been predicted.- 36 -
However, we would see four possible caveats remaining.
First, export shocks might only be estimated to be minor or to be insignificant in annual regres-
sions because they are instantaneously (i.e. in a period shorter than one year) neutralised by ad-
justment in the labour market. But estimations by Gros (1996) with quarterly data gave an even
stronger result: in almost no case can one detect an impact of external shocks on unemployment.
A second counter-argument against our results is that large shocks might have been rare events in
our sample. That is, variability in the historical export shock series would be too low to identify a
statistically significant impact on (un-) employment though it is in fact there. If this was the case,
EU countries need exchange rate movements from time to time to cope for large infrequent
asymmetric shocks and thus bear additional costs of higher unemployment in EMU. However, this
argument is by its nature impossible to falsify or confirm empirically with the available data. We
therefore did not pursue this argument any further.
Third, the low frequency of our data lead to a low number of degrees of freedom in our
estimations. That means, besides estimations with quarterly data one direction of future research
should be based on pooling of EU-country data. Another possible improvent might lie in the use
of SURE regressions. The seemingly unrelated regression method originally applies to a system
where each equation has an endogenous variable on the left side and only exogenous variables on
the right side. As in the standard regression case, the disturbances are assumed to be uncorrelated
with the exogenous variables. Each equation of this kind of a system could be estimated by
regression, equation by equation, as in Tab. 1 and 2. However, the disturbance in a regression
equation for one country could be correlated with the residual of an equation for some other
country, i.e. in the case of symmetric shocks to real variables. In this case, the SUR estimator
might be more efficient, because it explicitly takes account of the entire matrix of correlations of
all of the equations. Moreover, the presence of lagged dependent variables creates no problem
(though the SURE method assumes nonstochastic regressors), if the residuals in each equation
satisfy the classical assumptions.
Fourth, according to the Lucas-critique one should not extrapolate empirical results concerning
export shocks to EMU (Lucas 1976; Viñals and Jimeno 1997). We would argue, however, that
EMU will not affect the industrial structure of Europe in the short run. There is little reason to
believe that the variability of idiosyncratic shocks to exports will change substantially over the
next 5 - 10 years. Hence, we would argue that our results concerning the absence of a strong link
between export shocks and unemployment tax relevant for EMU.- 37 -
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Variable List
DEXPECU annual percentage change of EXPECU
DEXPECUAV change in European avg. of constant ECU exports
(EU15=Ameco E5 (1960-74), E8 (1975-90), E9 (1991-95))
DEXPECUDIFF change in difference with European avg. of constant ECU exports 
(DEXPECU - DEXPECUAV)
EMPLMAN employment in manufacturing (index)
EMPLMANEU EU-average employment in manufacturing (index),
EU = BE+DK+FR+IR+IT+NL+UK+WD (for limitations of data for other 
EU-countries)
EU15UE EU average unemployment rate (EU15=Ameco E5 (1960-74),
E8 (1975-90), E9 (1991-95))
EXPECU exports of goods and services at 1990 prices (billion ECU)
EXPGDP total exports of goods (% of GDP)
EXPGDPDIFF total exports of goods (% of GDP), difference with European average 
(E5EXPGDP)
EXPGDPEU intra-EU15 exports of goods (% of GDP)
EXPCONTR contribution of exports of goods and services to GDP growth at constant 
market prices (% GDP of preceding year).
EXPCONTRDIFF contribution of exports of goods and services to GDP growth at constant 
market prices (% GDP of preceding year), difference with European 
average (E8EXPCONTR)
E5EXPGDP total exports of goods (% of GDP) EU-average AMECO E5
E8EDXPCONTR contribution of exports of goods and services to GDP growth at constant 
market prices (% GDP of preceding year), AMECO E8
GOVDEF net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of general government (%of GDP at 
market prices)
GOVDEFC general government structural balance (surplus (+), deficit (-))
INTL nominal long-term interest rate
INTS nominal short-term interest rate
INV investment (gross fixed capital formation in constant prices)
REER real effective exchange rates relative to 19 industrial countries 
(1991=100, double export weights, unit labor costs)), increasing index 
means appreciation of the respective currency
RESEXPECUF shock component of EXPECU
RESEXPGDPEUF shock component of EXPGDPEU
SPREAD national interest rate spread INTL-INTS
UE unemployment rate
Data Sources: AMECO (European Commission), IFS (IMF), Own Calculations.- 40 -
Annex 1a: Estimated Export Demand Equations (DEXPECU)
LS // Dependent Variable is DBEEXPECU
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1996
Included observations: 34 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  3.462347  0.796349  4.347775  0.0002
DBEEXPECU(-2)  0.491160  0.119305  4.116831  0.0003
D83 -5.358391  2.296791 -2.332990  0.0271
D85 -5.267907  2.286050 -2.304371  0.0288
DGDPEU15  2.320083  0.255866  9.067571  0.0000
DGDPEU15(-1)  1.917525  0.305927  6.267914  0.0000
R-squared  0.777652     Mean dependent var  5.666973
Adjusted R-squared  0.737947     S.D. dependent var  4.355876
S.E. of regression  2.229822     Akaike info criterion  1.762629
Sum squared resid  139.2190     Schwarz criterion  2.031987
Log likelihood -72.20860     F-statistic  19.58572
Durbin-Watson stat  1.835570     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
LS // Dependent Variable is DDKEXPECU
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1996
Included observations: 35 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient   Std. Error  t-Statistic   Prob.
C  5.287208  0.399794  13.22482  0.0000
D75 -6.800426  2.387389 -2.848478  0.0079
D86 -5.386862  2.298731 -2.343406  0.0259
D93 -6.423151  2.328801 -2.758137  0.0098
DGDPEU15  0.249134  0.242050  1.029268  0.3116
R-squared 0.448424     Mean dependent var  4.726297
Adjusted R-squared  0.374881     S.D. dependent var  2.860403
S.E. of regression  2.261562     Akaike info criterion  1.763675
Sum squared resid  153.4399     Schwarz criterion  1.985868
Log likelihood -75.52716     F-statistic  6.097412
Durbin-Watson stat  1.954357     Prob(F-statistic)  0.001028- 41 -
LS // Dependent Variable is DESEXPECU
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1996
Included observations: 34 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  6.150268  1.480656  4.153746  0.0002
D67 -12.22870  5.031096 -2.430625  0.0213
DESEXPECU(-2)  0.269483  0.151071  1.783824  0.0846
DGDPEU15  1.292830  0.514233  2.514095  0.0175
R-squared  0.332596     Mean dependent var  7.823238
Adjusted R-squared  0.265856     S.D. dependent var  5.773077
S.E. of regression  4.946500     Akaike info criterion  3.307491
Sum squared resid  734.0357     Schwarz criterion  3.487063
Log likelihood -100.4713     F-statistic  4.983438
Durbin-Watson stat  1.335085     Prob(F-statistic)  0.006353
LS // Dependent Variable is DFREXPECU
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1996
Included observations: 34 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  2.375688  0.894646  2.655450  0.0131
D82 -5.763211  2.464723 -2.338280  0.0270
D8586 -6.576324  1.721604 -3.819882  0.0007
DFREXPECU(-1)  0.406581  0.133354  3.048891  0.0051
DFREXPECU(-2)  0.333685  0.142255  2.345672  0.0266
DGDPEU15  1.346086  0.272728  4.935646  0.0000
DGDPEU15(-1)  1.279472  0.316658  4.040546  0.0004
R-squared  0.737207     Mean dependent var  6.013484
Adjusted R-squared  0.678809     S.D. dependent var  4.115118
S.E. of regression  2.332190     Akaike info criterion  1.874857
Sum squared resid  146.8560     Schwarz criterion  2.189107
Log likelihood -73.11647     F-statistic  12.62377
Durbin-Watson stat  1.953002     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000001- 42 -
LS // Dependent Variable is DGREXPECU
Sample(adjusted): 1964 1996
Included observations: 33 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  9.718244  1.204805  8.066237  0.0000
D68 -12.10948  6.697531 -1.808052  0.0818
D8182 -15.31405  4.749746 -3.224184  0.0033
D90 -14.07035  6.627065 -2.123165  0.0431
DGDPEU15  1.628918  0.737064  2.210009  0.0358
DGDPEU15(-2)  1.352038  0.732939  1.844681  0.0761
R-squared  0.459742     Mean dependent var  7.729893
Adjusted R-squared  0.359694     S.D. dependent var  8.063044
S.E. of regression  6.451975     Akaike info criterion  3.891738
Sum squared resid  1123.955     Schwarz criterion  4.163830
Log likelihood -105.0387     F-statistic  4.595227
Durbin-Watson stat  1.453019     Prob(F-statistic)  0.003671
LS // Dependent Variable is DIREXPECU
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1996
Included observations: 35 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  9.440148  1.405129  6.718348  0.0000
D70  8.763078  4.141057  2.116145  0.0427
D84  8.038856  4.090496  1.965252  0.0587
DIREXPECU(-1) -0.194656  0.142307 -1.367855  0.1815
DGDPEU15  0.515777  0.415275  1.242013  0.2239
R-squared  0.291581     Mean dependent var  8.199894
Adjusted R-squared  0.197125     S.D. dependent var  4.482366
S.E. of regression  4.016348     Akaike info criterion  2.912310
Sum squared resid  483.9315     Schwarz criterion  3.134502
Log likelihood -95.62826     F-statistic  3.086953
Durbin-Watson stat  1.429497     Prob(F-statistic)  0.030523- 43 -
LS // Dependent Variable is DITEXPECU
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1996
Included observations: 35 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  5.543889  0.889407  6.233241  0.0000
D65  11.36985  3.087951  3.682004  0.0009
D80 -15.16455  3.101066 -4.890109  0.0000
D82 -8.629248  3.040619 -2.837990  0.0082
DITEXPECU(-1)  0.222148  0.105261  2.110447  0.0436
DGDPEU15  0.565049  0.315032  1.793621  0.0833
R-squared  0.665318     Mean dependent var  6.662281
Adjusted R-squared  0.607614     S.D. dependent var  4.760733
S.E. of regression  2.982157     Akaike info criterion  2.340099
Sum squared resid  257.9046     Schwarz criterion  2.606730
Log likelihood -84.61458     F-statistic  11.52988
Durbin-Watson stat  2.083981     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000003
LS // Dependent Variable is DNLEXPECU
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1996
Included observations: 35 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  2.494931  0.552152  4.518562  0.0001
D77 -7.817812  1.817200 -4.302120  0.0002
D82 -6.081719  1.805984 -3.367537  0.0022
D86 -4.807276  1.785048 -2.693079  0.0116
DNLEXPECU(-1)  0.689155  0.083765  8.227266  0.0000
DGDPEU15  1.778227  0.197374  9.009423  0.0000
R-squared  0.834740     Mean dependent var  5.569090
Adjusted R-squared  0.806247     S.D. dependent var  3.987884
S.E. of regression  1.755362     Akaike info criterion  1.280155
Sum squared resid  89.35753     Schwarz criterion  1.546786
Log likelihood -66.06555     F-statistic  29.29626
Durbin-Watson stat  1.880263     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
LS // Dependent Variable is DPOEXPECU
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1996
Included observations: 35 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  3.823557  1.497370  2.553516  0.0160
D64  25.53377  7.123509  3.584437  0.0012
D79  19.47339  7.065944  2.755951  0.0099
DPOEXPECU(-1)  0.364967  0.127034  2.872985  0.0074
DGDPEU15  2.313802  0.756261  3.059529  0.0046
R-squared  0.561368     Mean dependent var  7.479500
Adjusted R-squared  0.502884     S.D. dependent var  9.826530
S.E. of regression  6.928340     Akaike info criterion  4.002804
Sum squared resid  1440.057     Schwarz criterion  4.224997
Log likelihood -114.7119     F-statistic  9.598612- 44 -
Durbin-Watson stat  1.522523     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000040
LS // Dependent Variable is DUKEXPECU
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1996
Included observations: 34 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  3.330405  0.648661  5.134278  0.0000
D68  5.962196  2.328347  2.560700  0.0164
D74  6.156590  2.509867  2.452955  0.0209
D88 -5.316704  2.304817 -2.306779  0.0290
DUKEXPECU(-2)  0.215841  0.128918  1.674254  0.1056
DGDPEU15  1.204986  0.261241  4.612540  0.0001
DGDPEU15(-1)  1.126061  0.263318  4.276436  0.0002
R-squared  0.649649     Mean dependent var  4.185796
Adjusted R-squared  0.571793     S.D. dependent var  3.420419
S.E. of regression  2.238237     Akaike info criterion  1.792618
Sum squared resid  135.2621     Schwarz criterion  2.106869
Log likelihood -71.71842     F-statistic  8.344255
Durbin-Watson stat  2.393383     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000036
LS // Dependent Variable is DWDEXPECU
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1994
Included observations: 33 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  5.230151  0.993318  5.265332  0.0000
D75 -13.61327  2.966248 -4.589392  0.0001
D83 -7.736257  2.851115 -2.713415  0.0117
D86 -8.335845  2.863211 -2.911362  0.0073
D93 -7.798685  2.924823 -2.666378  0.0130
DWDEXPECU(-1) 0.308234  0.151359  2.036444  0.0520
DGDPEU15  0.625419  0.378513  1.652305  0.1105
R-squared  0.648540     Mean dependent var  5.806537
Adjusted R-squared  0.567434     S.D. dependent var  4.245197
S.E. of regression  2.792057     Akaike info criterion  2.239388
Sum squared resid  202.6851     Schwarz criterion  2.556829
Log likelihood -76.77488     F-statistic  7.996178
Durbin-Watson stat  1.835706     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000060- 45 -
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Annex 2: Descriptive Statistics for Time Series
-to be tabulated about here-
Annex 3: Selected Tests for Integration
Table A1: EXPECU
Series ADF(N) ADF(C) ADF(C,T) PP(N) PP(C) PP(C,T)
BEEXPECU 4.07 2.46 0.08 8.80 3.37 -0.03
DKEXPECU 3.99 2.16 -0.71 8.05 2.42 -1.27
ESEXPECU 3.47 2.66 1.15 9.02 4.82 2.21
FREXPECU 3.09 1.37 -1.74 6.44 2.24 -1.84
GREXPECU 2.69 1.13 -2.02 4.62 1.69 -1.92
IREXPECU 4.14 4.41 4.29 18.16 16.39 13.46
ITEXPECU 2.89 1.97 0.51 6.69 3.10 1.78
NLEXPECU 3.20 1.61 -0.70 6.62 2.12 -1.12
POEXPECU 3.24 1.98 -0.11 8.33 4.27 0.90
UKEXPECU 3.51 1.92 -0.44 7.09 2.42 -0.82
WDEXPECU 4.28 2.58 0.50 11.75 4.56 -0.12
ADF: empirical value of the ADF-test statistics (McKinnon, 1991); PP: empirical value of the Phillips-Perron
(1988) test statistics; */**/***: stationarity indicated for a=0,10/0,05/0,01; N/C/C,T: neither constant nor
trend/constante/constant and Trend in the test equation; sample: max. 1960-1996. Two lagged differences (ADF)
resp. two 'truncation lags' (PP) proved to be sufficient to gain the desired properties of the residuals. /: cannot be
calculated. n.a.: non available.- 47 -
Table A2: DEXPECU
Series ADF(N) ADF(C) ADF(C,T) PP(N) PP(C) PP(C,T)
DBEEXPECU -1.92* -4.13*** -4.80*** -2.57** -5.23*** -5.71***
DDKEXPECU -1.45 -3.97*** -4.85*** -2.04** -5.40*** -6.02***
DESEXPECU -1.33 -3.61** -4.37*** -2.11** -5.38*** -5.85***
DFREXPECU -1.30 -2.85* -3.78** -1.36 -3.43** -3.79**
DGREXPECU -1.64* -3.07** -3.82** -3.77*** -5.40*** -5.82***
DIREXPECU -0.46 -3.68*** -3.80** -3.02*** -8.35*** -9.23***
DITEXPECU -1.63 -3.22** -3.42* -2.42** -4.81*** -5.00***
DNLEXPECU -1.42 -2.91* -3.46* -1.85* -4.27*** -4.57***
DPOEXPECU -2.37** -3.92*** -4.01** -3.31*** -4.50*** -4.55***
DUKEXPECU -1.65* -4.12*** -4.11** -3.25*** -5.72*** -5.64***
DWDEXPECU -1.15 -3.23** -3.49** -2.32** -5.38*** -5.61***
Notes: see table A1.
Table A3: UE
Series ADF(N) ADF(C) ADF(C,T) PP(N) PP(C) PP(C,T)
BEUE 0.41 -0.98 -2.02 0.27 -0.88 -2.21
DKEUE -0.16 -1.27 -2.21 -0.23 -1.25 -1.96
ESUE 0.96 -0.47 -1.99 0.92 -0.40 -2.20
FRUE 1.42 -0.20 -2.52 2.03 -2.02 -2.36
GRUE 0.42 -0.91 -1.54 0.05 -0.97 -1.69
IRUE 0.45 -1.10 -1.82 0.57 -0.92 -1.87
ITUE 2.24 0.41 -3.05 3.35 1.73 -3.20*
NLUE 0.08 -1.35 -1.45 0.17 -1.19 -1.47
POUE -0.06 -1.63 -2.23 0.01 -1.57 -2.02
UKUE 0.35 -0.96 -1.69 0.25 -1.09 -1.56
WDUE 0.39 -0.86 -2.39 0.48 -0.67 -2.33
Notes: see table A1.- 48 -
Table A4: DUE
Series ADF(N) ADF(C) ADF(C,T) PP(N) PP(C) PP(C,T)
DBEUE -3.27*** -3.45** -3.38* -2.76*** -2.82* -2.72
DDKEUE -3.96*** -3.98*** -3.92** -3.76*** -3.69*** -3.64**
DESUE -3.15*** -3.69*** -3.59*** -2.58** -2.71* -2.62
DFRUE -2.71*** -3.53** -3.48* -3.75*** -4.28*** -4.19**
DGRUE -3.26** -3.33** -3.31* -2.21** -2.18 -2.27
DIRUE -3.62*** -3.75*** -3.70** -3.18*** -3.17** -3.10
DITUE -4.39*** -5.14*** -5.24*** -3.699*** -20.54*** /
DNLUE -3.89*** -4.01*** -4.02** -4.41*** -4.48*** -4.46***
DPOUE -3.17*** -3.21** -3.16 -3.28*** -3.29** -3.23*
DUKUE -4.48*** -4.61*** -4.55*** -2.84*** -3.20** -3.61**
DWDUE -3.97*** -4.15*** -4.08** -2.72*** -2.77* -2.66
Notes: see table A1.
Table A5: EMPLMAN
Series ADF(N) ADF(C) ADF(C,T) PP(N) PP(C) PP(C,T)
EMPLMANBE -1.80* -0.39 -2.23 -1.58 -0.04 -2.64
EMPLMANDK -1.05 -1.72 -1.84 -1.25 -1.91 -1.91
EMPLMANES -0.54 -1.78 -2.23 -1.81 -2.22 -2.28
EMPLMANFR -1.09 0.10 -1.74 -0.98 0.27 -1.54
EMPLMANGR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
EMPLMANIR 1.26 -1.24 -1.91 1.57 -1.66 -2.11
EMPLMANIT -0.50 -1.04 -1.25 -0.36 -1.20 -1.24
EMPLMANNL -2.09** -1.36 -1.67 -1.78 -0.55 -2.22
EMPLMANPO -1.01 -2.00 -4.26** -0.58 -1.21 -2.22
EMPLMANUK -2.76*** -1.31 -1.55 -3.32*** -1.01 -1.75
EMPLMANWD -1.42 -0.32 -2.42 -1.35 -0.03 -2.31
Notes: see table A1.- 49 -
Table A6: REER
Series ADF(N) ADF(C) ADF(C,T) PP(N) PP(C) PP(C,T)
BEREER -0.25 -2.68* -2.86 -0.26 -2.34 -2.31
DEREER -1.86 0.28 -1.83 0.47 -2.30 -2.27
DKREER 0.42 -2.35 -2.19 0.55 -2.34 -2.15
ESREER 0.24 -3.06** -3.53* 0.30 -2.34 -2.44
FRREER -1.09 -1.41 -2.40 -1.21 -1.30 -2.66
GRREER -1.08 -2.24 -1.39 -1.79* -2.86* -1.62
IRREER -0.71 -1.42 -2.31 -0.79 -1.44 -2.08
ITREER -0.24 -2.53 -2.48 -0.34 -2.04 -1.99
NLREER 0.29 -2.10 -2.00 0.41 -2.20 -1.87
POREER -0.09 -1.54 -1.40 -0.25 -1.79 -1.59
UKREER -0.71 -2.55 -2.48 -2.06 -2.04 -0.76
Notes: see table A1.
Table A7: GDPEU15
Series ADF(N) ADF(C) ADF(C,T) PP(N) PP(C) PP(C,T)
GDPEU15 -1.28 -1.88 -2.74 -1.69 -3.20** -4.13**
DGDPEU15 -4.61*** -4.65*** -4.58*** -18.79*** -31.14*** -31.59***
Notes: see table A1.- 50 -
Table A8: D(INV)
Series ADF(N) ADF(C) ADF(C,T) PP(N) PP(C) PP(C,T)
INVBE -2.37** -2.63 -2.57 -3.55*** -3.74*** -3.67**
INVDK -3.09*** -3.02** -2.94 -3.90*** -3.81*** -3.77**
INVES -2.79*** -2.92* -2.87 -2.54** -2.59 -2.47
INVFR -2.72*** -2.93* -2.81 -2.86*** -2.94* -2.83
INVGR -4.27*** -4.33*** -4.16** -4.60*** -4.52*** -4.60***
INVIR -2.33** -2.66* -2.52 -3.40*** -3.62** -3.49*
INVIT -2.64** -3.00** -2.96 -3.10*** -3.30** -3.18
INVNL -2.49** -2.78* -2.86 -3.17*** -3.31** -3.32*
INVPO -3.30*** -3.88*** -3.75** -3.00*** -3.07** -3.00
INVUK -2.53** -2.87* -2.82 -2.82*** -2.96* -2.89
INVWD -3.04*** -3.07** -3.03 -2.94*** -2.87* -2.84
The above tables have to be taken as selected examples. Results of the remaining integration tests
are available from the authors on request.